Docker security in web simulation tools: a layered approach by Barranquero Fernandez, Marcos et al.
 
Proceedings of Eurasiaweb International Conference, Marrakesh, Morocco, 26th – 27th August, 2021 
11 
DOCKER SECURITY IN WEB SIMULATION TOOLS: A LAYERED 
APPROACH 
 
1MARCOS BARRANQUERO, 2JUAN CASADO, 3JOSEFA GÓMEZ, 4ABDELHAMID TAYEBI,  
5JOSÉ A. JIMÉNEZ 
 
1,3,4Computer Science Department, University of Alcalá, Alcalá de Henares, Spain 
2Starleaf, Building 7, Hatters Lane Watford WD18 8YN, United Kingdom 
5Department of Electronics, University of Alcalá, Alcalá de Henares, Spain 




Abstract - In this work, container security issues and strengths are studied using Docker as the main implementation. First, 
the container infrastructure is described and compared against the traditional approach of virtual machines. Secondly, the 
Docker containers security is discussed by the different infrastructure layers that compose them and different solutions are 
proposed to try to decrease the attack surface over this kind of applications. 
 




In the last years, the popularity of containers has 
increased due to necessities such as the need of a 
more agile application deployment or one that 
provides better performance needs compared against 
other alternatives like VMs (Virtual Machines). 
When it comes to security, as other papers have 
studied [1], container applications have a wide attack 
surface, that ranges from the container image and its 
possible vulnerabilities, to the container daemon [2], 
including the applications and processes being 
executed in the container and the host that runs it. 
Recent years have seen a huge increase in the 
development and use of this technologies, as it can be 
seen in [3]. Alongside this increase, security concern 
towards the deployment and usage in production of 
containerized applications has increased too, leading 
to multiple security studies with different approaches 
and focuses, like from a Platform-as-a-Service point 
of view [4] or providing a framework and metrics like 
[5].  The aim of this work is to provide a structured 
guide of security concerns and good practices for the 
reader interested in deploying a secure dockerized 
application with safety. For this task, a set of good 
practices and resources are listed in this work, 
classified by layers. On section II, the evolution 
leading from VM to containers is briefly discussed. 
Section III describes the docker container 
infrastructure, regarding the docker daemon and host. 
Section IV presents different security concerns, 
examples and consideration related to each level of 
the docker infrastructure. The conclusions and future 
work are included in Section V.  
 
II. FROM VIRTUAL MACHINES TO 
CONTAINERS 
 
Traditionally, virtual machines have been used for the 
purpose of emulating the hardware and software of a 
real machine. Each virtual machine constitutes a 
piece of software that emulates a real machine’s 
hardware. It uses the host real hardware to simulate 
an environment exactly identical to a real machine 
with the designated operating system, and other 
programs already installed and ready to use. Virtual 
machines are used in multiple use cases: to simulate a 
multiple-machine interconnected infrastructure to 
provide a service, to execute software from an 
isolated and sandboxed perspective, or to provide 
compatibility with different software that cannot be 
run on the host machine operating system. 
 
However, VMs have some drawbacks: 
 
 It takes a lot of resources from the host machine 
in a blocking form in most of the VM clients. For 
example, the RAM or storage will be designated 
before launching the virtual machine, and will be 
a fixed value even though not all the RAM or 
storage is being actually used. 
 VMs are less efficient than real hardware, since 
they are accessing the resources in an indirect 
way or simulating them by software. 
 VM’s portability is limited and difficult: sharing 
a VM image involves large files and usually 
includes vendor data [6]. Additionally, 
environment replication is difficult to manage, 




Containers came as a solution to these problems, 
looking to provide better performance, decrease the 
storage and power usage, process isolation and easier 
portability. 
 
A container is a software unit that contains one or 
more applications and all the requirements and 
libraries needed to execute them. It is a lightweight 
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and isolated package that is ensured to work with 
independence from the platform where it is executed. 
 
Originally, Docker ran over Linux containers, known 
as LXC, but then moved to libcontainer, running in 
the same OS (Operating System) as the host machine. 
This allows containers to share most of the host 
operating system resources and run using the host 
kernel, providing a more efficient approach than the 
virtual machines, especially when running multiple 
virtualized services. 
 
Docker provides additional features over LXC or 
libcontainer, like the automatic build feature that 
allows developers to define the commands to be 
executed when the container is launched, or the 
possibility to share different container images over 
the Docker registry. 
 
In the end, the weight of the advantages and 
disadvantages of virtual machines and containers is 
determined by the use case. For isolated multiple 
process that are deployed as microservices, containers 
should be the initial choice. Dynamic resource 
allocation is possible in containers and on VMs. 
 
Some orchestrators, like Kubernetes, provide 
dynamic control on the resource assignation. 
However, if a process needs complete isolation and 
guaranteed resources, a VM may be the best solution. 
 
III. DOCKER CONTAINER ARCHITECTURE 
 
Docker is composed by three main parts: the docker 
client, the Docker host and the Docker registry. 
 
The Docker client is the interface through which the 
developer can interact with the docker host. When a 
command like docker run is executed, the Docker 
client communicates to the docker daemon using the 
Docker API. This allows to deploy an environment 
where the Docker client is separated from the Docker 
host. This approach could be useful to have more 
control and flexibility over Docker clients, being able 
to monitor them from the interface and allocating 
more or less resources depending on the use. 
 
The docker registry is a storage and distribution 
system for different Docker images. It allows the 
developers to push and pull images, working as a 
repository. By default, the Docker registry used is 
Docker Hub, a repository of public and private 
container images. 
 
A Docker image is a binary file that includes all of 
the requirements for running a Docker container: 
stores the dependencies, tools, libraries and source 
code needed for an application to run. The image 
works as a template, similar to a snapshot for a virtual 
machine. The Docker image is usually divided in 
layers, where the first layer contains the base image 
of an operating system, and the container layers that 
describe the commands and executable files to be 
executed.  
 
IV. DOCKER SECURITY BY LEVELS 
 
4.1. Host Level 
The host machine is where the docker daemon and 
the containers run. It is important to configure and 
harden the operating system of the host in order to 
secure it against possible attackers on a production 
environment. 
 
It is also important to configure docker properly. 
Some good practices are: 
 
 Docker containers should be run with the least 
privilege possible. By default, Docker requires 
root permissions to be executed, so a good 
practice is to add the user to the docker group. 
 Docker has a feature that allows to add and 
remove capabilities to the containers, similarly to 
SecComp which is discussed later. Only the 
needed capabilities should be used in order to 
reduce the attack surface of the deployed 
container. 
 By default, containers are allowed to escalate 
privileges when required. There is an optional 
security policy that denies the possibility to 
acquire new privileges once the container is 
running. 
 Docker installation files should be secured. It is a 
good idea to review and restrict the file 
permissions and verify that the owner is the root 
user. 
 Whenever possible, latest software versions 
should be used, since the latest version will have 
most of the known vulnerabilities patched. This 
goes for the docker package, the host operating 
system or mostly every software layer that 
interacts with the containers. 
 
4.2. Application Level 
With regard to application development, the design 
must integrate security by default applying the 
different known principles of secure development, 
without neglecting those sections that make the 
container interact with the outside world: input 
verification, secure APIs, etc. 
 
An interesting approach is the distroless images [7] 
that, excluding the operating system, seek to include 
only applications and their runtime dependencies. 
They have neither a shell nor a package manager, nor 
the vast majority of packages that are usually 
included by default in Linux distributions. 
 
This allows to deploy debloated containers, which do 
not contain anything installed beyond what is 
Docker Security in Web Simulation Tools: A Layered Approach 
Proceedings of Eurasiaweb International Conference, Marrakesh, Morocco, 26th – 27th August, 2021 
13 
necessary, significantly reducing the attack surface 
and therefore providing a hardened container. 
 
4.3. Container Operating System Level 
Different hardening techniques have been suggested 
in papers like [8], where hardening tools and 
implementations are used. An overview of these tools 
would be described next. 
 
1) SELinux: As described in [9], SELinux is a 
security architecture for Linux systems that allows 
administrators to have more control over who can 
access the system, and defines access controls for the 
applications, processes, and files on a system. 
 
SELinux has different running modes. Enforcing, 
which is the default mode, will to enforce security 
policies over the application requests. 
 
On the other hand, at the moment of running a 
container, Docker supports different options such as 
running a mounted volume over a host directory. 
Even though the container image has SELinux in 
enforcing mode, since the volume is shared between 
the host and the container, the host files will be 
accessible from the container and vice versa. 
 
This is due to the fact that the Docker daemon has 
SELinux disabled by default. It is possible to enable it 
by overwriting the daemon settings with a new 
configuration file, as instructed in [10]: 
 
[root@marcos]$ docker info | grep Security -A3 
Security Options: 
  seccomp 
     Profile: default 
# SELinux is not enabled. 
[root@marcos]$ cat /etc/docker/daemon.json 
{ 
      "selinux-enabled": true 
} 
# Docker service must be restarted 
[root@marcos]$ systemctl restart docker 
[root@marcos]$ docker info | grep Security -A3 
  Security Options: 
     seccomp 
       Profile: default 
     selinux # Selinux is enabled now 
 
With this configuration it is still possible to mount 
and access the volume files, but the unmounted host 
files will not be writable or readable from the 
container anymore. 
 
2) AppArmor: AppArmor is another Linux security 
module that restrains the access and permissions of 
applications, similarly to SELinux. However, 
AppArmor allows to define different security 
configurations for each program. 
 
Docker allows to run containers loading different 
AppArmor profiles with the running command. By 
default, it runs the dockerdefault policy profile. 
 
AppArmor profiles can be very flexible: the profiles 
use a globbing syntax that allows to define rules to 
accept or deny network traffic by protocol or IP. They 
can also define the directories that are writable or 
mountable, and allow or deny certain capabilities. 
 
3) SecComp: SecComp is a kernel module that 
provides additional security with different profiles. 
Unlike AppArmor or SELinux, 
 
SecComp allows to define profiles that limit the 
system calls and allow to manage the available call 
from within the Docker containers to the host’s 
kernel. 
 
Once again, if there is no SecComp profile specified, 
Docker will run the default profile. As it can be read 
in [11], by default, the SecComp profile limits system 
calls like the CAP SYS BOOT reboot system call, 
that would allow the containers to reboot the host. 
 
However, in a production environment, maybe it is 
interesting to allow or deny certain system calls that 
could interfere within the service continuity, blocking 
commands like chmod or mkdir that contains 
potentially dangerous system calls. 
 
The SecComp filters are written in a JSON file 
format, and loaded at the time the container is 
launched. 
A simple example of applying a SecComp profile the 
”hello-world” image would be: 
 
[root@marcos]$ cat chmod.json 
{ 
     "defaultAction":"SCMP_ACT_ALLOW", 
     "syscalls":[ 
          { 
"name":"chmod", 
"action":"SCMP_ACT_ERRNO"           }     ] } 
[root@marcos]$ docker run hello-world  
--security-opt seccomp:chmod.json 
 
For this simple example, the profile works as a 
blacklist: the default action for any system call is to 
allow it with the SCMP ACT ALLOW tag. But for 
the chmod call, the action to be taken is to deny the 
call, with the SCMP ACT ERRNO tag. 
 
4.4. Communication Level 
If a Docker container is deployed with the client and 
the daemon running on different machines, it would 
be desirable to secure the docker API communication 
with TLS or SSH [12]. In addition, it is possible to 
run the docker daemon and client in different modes, 
where the client and the host authenticate each other. 
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4.5. Image and Registry Level 
As it is shown in [13], the images of the most popular 
docker registry, Dockerhub, do not always provide 
adequate security for the deployment. Recently, 
Docker has included a vulnerability scanning tool 
built into the docker client and Dockerhub, which 
allows to identify potential vulnerabilities in the 
container’s images. Additionally, there are external 
tools such as Snyk [14], which can scan and monitor 
container images at different stages of the 
deployment. The tool allows the user to scan a 
Dockerfile, a Git repository or a Docker image, 
looking for potential vulnerabilities like outdated 
dependencies or configuration vulnerabilities, and 
presenting alternatives and suggestions on to fix 
them. A good practice to keep in mind is the use of 
multi-staged builds: a way to build the container by 
selecting to load only specific elements from several 
different previously built images. This creates a small 
image with just the commands and dependencies to 
run, reducing the attack surface and providing 
flexibility in development and deployment. This 
could be useful, for example, in a use case where 
there are two container images: a large one with the 
SDK and the needed compilations tools to compile 
the source code of an application, and a small base 
image with only the needed runtime dependencies for 
running the compiled application, producing a 




As the use of containers and Docker grows, concerns 
about container security increase. It is difficult to 
maintain an adequate level of security while keeping 
pace with software updates and use. More research 
and dissemination should be done on the different 
hardening techniques in order to increase the average 
level of safety. To do this, future work will study 
more methods and approaches to add security by 
default at different layers and levels, as well as 
performing security verification of container images 
and related software or real-time protection and 




This work was supported by the University of Alcala 
through project CCG20/IA-045. 
 
The authors would like to thank professor Javier 
Junquera Sánchez for providing multiple resources 
and different points of view on the matter of adding 




[1] T. Combe, A. Martin, R. Di Pietro, “To Docker or Not to 
Docker: A Security Perspective”, IEEE Cloud Computing, 
vol. 3, no. 5, pp. 54-62, Sept.-Oct. 2016. 
[2] S. Sultan , I. Ahmad, T. Dimitriou, “Container Security: 
Issues, Challenges, and the Road Ahead”, IEEE Access, vol. 
7, pp. 5297-52996, 17 April 2019. 
[3] Sysig, “Container usage report of 2019”. [Online]. Available 
from: https://sysdig.com/blog/sysdig-2019-container-usage-
report/. 
[4] A. R. Manu, J. K. Patel, S. Akhtar, V. K. Agrawal and K. N. 
B. Subramanya, ”A study, analysis and deep dive on cloud 
PAAS security in terms of Docker container security”, 2016 
International Conference on Circuit, Power and Computing 
Technologies, pp. 1-13, 2016, doi: 
10.1109/ICCPCT.2016.7530284. 
[5] H. Jin, Z. Li, D. Zou and B. Yuan, “DSEOM: A Framework 
for Dynamic Security Evaluation and Optimization of MTD 
in Container-Based Cloud”, IEEE Transactions on 
Dependable and Secure Computing, vol. 18, no. 3, pp. 1125-
1136, 1 May-June 2021, doi:10.1109/TDSC.2019.2916666. 
[6] D. Kargatzis, S. Sotiriadis and E. G. M. Petrakis, “Virtual 
machine migration in heterogeneous clouds: from openstack 
to VMWare”, 2017 IEEE 38th Sarnoff Symposium, pp. 1-6, 
2017, doi: 10.1109/SARNOF.2017.8080393. 
[7] GoogleContainerTools Organization, “Distroless Docker 
Images”. [Online]. Available from: 
https://github.com/GoogleContainerTools/distroless. 
[8] Amith Raj MP, A. Kumar, S. J. Pai and A. Gopal, 
”Enhancing security of Docker using Linux hardening 
techniques,” 2016 2nd International Conference on Applied 
and Theoretical Computing and Communication Technology 
(iCATccT), pp. 94-99, 2016, doi: 
10.1109/ICATCCT.2016.7911971. 
[9] RedHat, “What is SELinux?”. [Online]. Available from: 
https://www.redhat.com/en/topics/linux/what-is-selinux. 




[11] Docker, “Seccomp security profiles for Docker”. [Online]. 
Available from: 
https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/seccomp/. 
[12] Docker, “Protect the Docker daemon socket”. [Online]. 
Available from: 
https://docs.docker.com/engine/security/protect-access/ 
[13] Snyk, “Top ten most popular docker images each contain at 
least 30 vulnerabilities”. [Online]. Available from: 
https://snyk.io/blog/top-tenmost-popular-docker-images-
each-contain-at-least-30-vulnerabilities/ 
[14] Snyk, “Snyk open source security management tool”. 
[Online]. Available from: https://snyk.io/product/open-
source-security-management/ 
 
 
 
